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On Walter Benjamin, Antonio Gramsci and 





A comparison of  when and how Walter Benjamin and Antonio 
Gramsci treated elitist traditions as a problem must consider the 
different starting conditions of  the two contemporaries. Benjamin 
grew up in the west of  Berlin in a Jewish family of  the haute 
bourgeoisie. In the stately family home, several domestic workers, 
including a French governess, looked after the three children: Dora 
(1901–1946), who would become a social scientist and psychologist; 
Georg (1895–1942), who would become a politically engaged 
pediatrician in Berlin and a member of  Germany’s communist 
party; and the oldest child, the later philosopher, literary scholar, 
translator, critic and historian Walter Benjamin (1892–1940), who at 
age 40 could still not make his own coffee (Eiland and Jennings 
2014, p. 18). Benjamin attended the Kaiser-Friedrich-Schule in 
Berlin-Charlottenburg, received private tuition and spent two years 
at the Haubinda “Landerziehungsheim” in Thuringia. Antonio 
Gramsci (1891–1937) was born as the fourth of  seven children in 
Ales, Sardinia. Due to the several years that his father spent in 
prison, the family was impoverished. Despite his hump and small 
stature, Gramsci had to work in a cadastral office in Ghilarza before 
he could go to a small secondary school (ginnasio) in Santu 
Lussurgiu and, after his father had been released from prison, 
attended a lyceum (liceo) in Cagliari starting in 1908. There, Gramsci 
wrote an essay on the oppressed and “unfortunate peoples in the 
colonies,” stating that “[w]ars are waged for trade, not for 
civilization: how many cities of  China did the English bombard, 
when the Chinese would not buy their opium? Some civilization!” 
(quoted in Fiori 1970/1990, pp. 67-8).1 Unlike Benjamin, Gramsci 
had been confronted with unequal social conditions from an early 
age. Malaria, trachoma, tuberculosis and hunger were widespread in 
 
1 “… e allora la vecchia Europa inorridita impreca contro i barbari, contro gli incivili, e una 
nuova crociata viene bandita contro quei popoli infelici… Le guerre sono fatte per il 
commercio, non per la civiltà: gli Inglesi hanno bombardato chissà quante città della Cina per i 
Cinesi che non volevano sapere del loro oppio. Altro che civiltà!” (Fiori 1966/1991, p. 78). 




Sardinia. Although the overall illiteracy rate had declined over the 
course of  the nineteenth century, the relative North-South literacy 
gap had grown in its first half  (cf. Ciccarelli/Weisdorf  2018).2 
 
1. The early Gramsci and Benjamin on education 
Gramsci wrote about educational issues and the problem of  
illiteracy3 on a social scale from an early age on. The bourgeoisie, he 
stated in “The Problem of  the School” [“Il problema della scuola”], 
had no interest at all in these issues because it did not develop and 
impose a real educational program.4 It is likely that an opposition 
between bourgeois education as something mechanical and a 
concept of  culture as self-discipline, a “higher awareness” of  “one’s 
own historical value, one’s own function in life, one’s own rights 
and obligations,” contributed to this assessment (Gramsci 2000, 
p. 57). In his article “Men or Machines?” [“Uomini o macchine?”], 
published on 24 December 1916 in Avanti!, the newspaper of  the 
Italian Socialist Party, Gramsci addressed education as a question of  
class. Children from the working class were “excluded from the 
middle and high schools as a result of  the present social 
conditions” and received little support, even if  they deserved it and 
wished to study. According to Gramsci, the proletariat needed an 
education system that was open to all (Gramsci 2000, pp. 63-4). 
Gramsci, for whom communism was an “integral humanism” 
(Losurdo 2000, pp. 33-7), advocated a humanist education in 
reference to the Renaissance. He called for “[a] school of  freedom 
and free initiative, not a school of  slavery and mechanical precis-
ion” (Gramsci 2000, pp. 63-4). Proletarian children should all be 
given opportunities to develop their own individuality in an optimal 
way, for themselves and society. The technical and vocational 
schools, Gramsci said, should not be “incubators of  little monsters 
aridly trained for a job,” but should also provide “general ideas,” 
“culture” and “intellectual stimulation” (Gramsci 2000, p. 64). 
Gramsci criticized the popular universities, some of  which were 
 
2 In 1911, in Calabria the illiteracy rate for adult men was about 50% and for women 78%, and 
in Sardinia about 50% among men and over 60% among women; in Piedmont, on the other 
hand, less than 5% were still illiterate, and in Liguria and Lombardy about 10%, almost in equal 
measure among men and women (Ciccarelli/Weisdorf  2018, p. 345). 
3 See Gramsci’s article “Illiteracy” [“Analfabetismo”] published on 11 February 1917 in the 
socialist youth magazine La Città futura (Gramsci 2000, pp. 67-8). 
4 See Gramsci’s article “The Problem of  the School” in L’Ordine Nuovo of  27 June 1919 
(Gramsci 2000, pp. 68-70, here p. 69).  




supported by the Italian Socialist Party, in the article “The Popular 
University” [“L’Università popolare”], published on 29 December 
1916 in Avanti!. “In Turin,” where Gramsci had gone to study in 
1911, “the Popular University is a cold flame. It is neither a univer-
sity, nor popular. Its directors are amateurs in matters of  cultural 
organization. What causes them to act is a mild and insipid spirit of  
charity, not a live and fecund desire to contribute to the spiritual 
raising of  the multitude through teaching” (Gramsci 2000, p. 65).  
Benjamin’s early consideration of  education took its point of  
departure from the reform pedagogue Gustav Wyneken (1875–
1964), who had been Benjamin’s teacher in the “Landerziehungs-
heim” in Haubinda. In a conservative interpretation of  Hegel, 
Wyneken focused on the subordination of  the individual to an 
objective spirit developing in youth as a ‘generation’ (Sagriotis 2019, 
pp. 128-9). For Wyneken, youth represented “a spiritual attitude” 
and an empirical phase of  human development, at the same time an 
elite group that ‘serves’ that spirit in confrontation with a society 
imagined as senseless and abysmal. In this way, a utopian path out 
was to be found within society through this elite (Hillach 1999, 
p. 879). Very different from Gramsci, Benjamin, who in 1914 
became chairperson of  the Freie Studentenschaft in Berlin, negotiated 
humanistic traditions at that time. In the journal Der Anfang, edited 
by Siegfried Bernfeld, Georges Barbizon and Fritz Schoengarth, 
Benjamin published the short text “On the Classical Secondary 
School” [“Über das humanistische Gymnasium”] (EW, pp. 94-100; 
GS II, pp. 39-42) as part of  the larger article “Teaching and 
Valuation” [“Unterricht und Wertung”]. In this text, Benjamin 
demanded a school that “would necessarily be hostile to the present 
day, undemocratic, high-spirited, and would allow no easy 
compromises with the modern secondary school, or the technical 
school, or other non-classical institutions” (EW, p. 96; cf. Witte 
1976, pp. 16-8). With the ‘we’ of  a ‘generation’ understood as 
‘youth,’ Benjamin opposed a ‘generation of  fathers’ and the ‘rest of  
society.’ He harbored “at bottom great sympathy for the classical 
education” as an “educational vision that has preserved in itself  a 
noble serenity and remained immune to the frenzied Darwinian 
utilitarianism of  the rest of  our pedagogy” (EW, p. 95). Benjamin 
demanded, “But no more of  this desiccated humanism!” (p. 96). As 
‘desiccated,’ he understood a humanism representing a “fabulous 




realm of  ‘harmonies’ and ‘ideals’” (ibid.). Against such a concept of  
humanism, he set the “woman-despising and man-loving Greece of  
Pericles, aristocratic, with slavery, with the dark myths of  
Aeschylus” (ibid.). It is conceivable that Benjamin would insist on a 
kind of  historical realism against the abstract humanistic ideal here. 
However, this interpretation is challenged by the emphasis with 
which Benjamin conjured a metaphysical conception of  the spirit 
of  youth following Wyneken in this period, setting it against the 
empirical as a whole and rejecting the latter. From this perspective, 
it is more likely that the humanism that Benjamin had in mind was 
ultimately an ‘educational aristocratic anti-humanism’ (Cancik 2012, 
p. 139) inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche – or the ‘humanism’ of  an 
elite whose ‘leadership’ the young Benjamin claimed for himself  as 
Gustav Wyneken’s eager pupil. 
Even so, Benjamin broke with Wyneken when the latter put the 
‘spirit of  youth’ at the service of  war; Benjamin held on to the 
purity of  the ideal against his former teacher. Benjamin therefore 
did not break immediately with his metaphysical horizon. His 
retreat was rather the “ultimate consequence of  the orientation of  
his thinking towards the ideal” (Steizinger 2013, p. 55, trans. FV). In 
Benjamin’s critical evaluation of  his time in the youth movement in 
“The Life of  Students” (1915) [“Das Leben der Studenten”], 
criticism is given a central position. It would be the “historical task 
[…] to disclose [gestalten] this immanent state of  perfection and 
make it absolute, to make it visible and dominant in the present” 
(SW 1, p. 37). Nevertheless, this “task” is “to grasp its metaphysical 
structure, as with the messianic domain or the idea of  the French 
Revolution” (ibid.). How stark the contrast was to Gramsci’s social 
thought at this time can be seen in Benjamin’s reserve toward “the 
socially relevant achievement of  the,” as he put it, “average person” 
[Durchschnittsmenschen]. For Benjamin, there was “no internal or 
authentic connection between the spiritual existence of  a student 
and, say, his concern for the welfare of  workers’ children or even 
for other students” (SW 1, p. 40). 
 
2. The public and the authority of  the critic for Benjamin 
Against this backdrop, it is understandable why it took Benjamin 
until his trip to Moscow in 1926/27 to write about a problem like 
illiteracy (cf. GS IV, pp. 337-8). Even though Benjamin wanted to 




overcome state and law by means of  a general strike serving as 
“divine violence” (SW 1, pp. 249-50) in his “Critique of  Violence” 
[“Zur Kritik der Gewalt”] in 1921, it was only then that questions 
of  education also appeared to him as social questions in a broader 
understanding and not as a privileged topic for a social ‘elite.’ This 
late interest was also due to the relation between Benjamin’s 
philosophy of  history and aesthetics at the time. At any rate, the 
concept of  the ‘creature’ in the Origin of  the German Trauerspiel 
(1924/25) [Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels] formed a kind of  
egalitarian, theological-anthropological objection to elitism insofar 
as it encompassed all people. Even the absolutist sovereign, tyrant 
and martyr at the same time, “as highly enthroned as he is over his 
subjects and his state” and despite his position as “lord of  
creatures,” “remains a creature” (OGT, p. 72) and is therefore not 
excluded from melancholy and self-doubt. In his dissertation The 
Concept of  Criticism in German Romanticism [Der Begriff  der Kunstkritik 
in der deutschen Romantik], Benjamin distanced himself  from history 
as an “event” [Geschehen] in order to gain a deeper insight into 
history “as content” [Gehalt] as a philosopher of  art. In his 
dissertation, Benjamin quoted from Charlotte Pingoud’s Grundlinien 
der ästhetischen Doktrin Friedrich Schlegels: “‘Art, bestowing shape from 
the impulse of  striving spirituality, binds the latter in ever new 
forms with the occurrence of  the entire life of  the present and the 
past. Art fastens not on particular events of  history but on its 
totality; from the viewpoint of  eternally self-perfecting mankind, it 
draws the complex of  events together, rendering them unified and 
manifest’” (SW 1, p. 138). While Pingoud was skeptical of  the high 
demands on art in Schlegel’s theory (Pingoud 1914, p. 63), 
Benjamin insisted that the conception of  the ‘absolute’ in Schlegel 
should not be replaced by education, harmony, genius, religion, 
organization or history; rather, it should be reserved for art only 
(SW 1, pp. 137-8). This had an important consequence. Friedrich 
Schlegel’s focus on the potential of  the individual work of  art, in 
addition to its ‘unfolding’ through criticism and translation, was 
given a special emphasis by Benjamin as a privileged medium of  
historical insight. At this time, and also in his well-known letter to 
Rang in December 1923,5 Benjamin assumed that history wandered 
 
5 “The attempt to insert the work of  art into historical life does not open new perspectives into 
its inner existence, as is the case with the life of  nations, where the same procedure points to 




into the works and became interpretable through later criticism, 
while works of  art themselves – similar to Croce’s distinction 
between history of  art and history of  culture (cf. Forgacs in 
Gramsci 2012, p. 89) – should never be understood as an immanent 
part of  a cultural history. This view had both the condition and the 
consequence that it is inadequate to study history through the 
works of  historians and fruitless to approach works of  art with a 
historicizing method. For Benjamin before 1924, history could best 
be studied in works of  art if  they were isolated from it.  
This focus on a “content” [Gehalt] of  history in the work of  art 
while at the same time distancing it from history and society was 
favored by Theodor W. Adorno up to his posthumously published 
Aesthetic Theory [Ästhetische Theorie] (1970).6 Though this corresponds 
to Benjamin’s self-descriptions of  his own method in the first half  
of  the 1920s up to the “Epistemo-Critical Foreword” [“Erkenntnis-
kritische Vorrede”] of  Origin of  the German Trauerspiel [Ursprung des 
deutschen Trauerspiels] or the above-mentioned letter to Rang, it does 
not capture other aspects of  the method he ultimately used 
throughout the “Trauerspielbuch.” It seems rather that Benjamin, 
while working on the book, began to combine his philosophical 
aesthetics of  history with a history of  concepts. While in his 
dissertation Benjamin contextualized Schlegel’s theory of  critique 
through Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s concept of  reflection (SW 1, 
pp. 120-35; cf. Fetscher 2006/2011, pp. 154-5), he now used this 
method not only for theory but for art as well, so that the Baroque 
dramas necessarily had to be historically contextualized. Therefore, 
Benjamin had turned against the view of  “the tragic myth” in 
Nietzsche’s theory of  tragedy as “a purely aesthetic construct” 
(OGT, p. 94) and integrated individual social aspects into his 
analysis. Indeed, in some passages of  the “Trauerspielbuch” 
 
the role of  the different generations and other essential factors. The current preoccupations of  
art history all amount to no more than the history of  contents [Stoff-Geschichte] or forms 
[Form-Geschichte], for which works of  art seem to provide merely examples or models; a 
history of  the works of  art themselves is not considered” (Benjamin to Rang, letter of  
9 December 1923, SW 1, p. 388). 
6 In his aesthetics and epistemology, Adorno sought to establish a primacy between the 
relationships of  art in history on the one hand and history in art on the other – in favor of  the 
latter: “The immanence of  society in the artwork is the essential social relation of  art, not the 
immanence of  art in society. Because the social content of  art is not located externally to its 
principium individuationis but rather inheres in individuation, which is itself  a social reality, 
art’s social character is concealed and can only be grasped by its interpretation” (Adorno 2002, 
p. 232). 




Benjamin wrote that the “content” of  the work of  art does not 
show itself  in the isolated artwork itself, but rather through 
historical reconstructions of  the artwork’s relationship to history, 
which cannot be found in the work of  art alone (OGT, p. 91). For 
instance, he argued that it was only in the light of  the Baroque 
concept of  sovereignty and the by no means aesthetic, absolutist 
legal relations that the interrelationship of  Baroque martyr and 
tyrant dramas became apparent. The drama of  the tyrant and the 
drama of  the martyr, Benjamin wrote, “retain their curious 
parallelism only so long as one overlooks the juristic aspect of  
Baroque monarchy” (OGT, p. 54). If  we stick to Benjamin’s 
methodological self-descriptions, one could say that Benjamin 
studied art and literature at least until about 1923 to avoid getting 
too involved with political history, or only and insofar as it can be 
found inside the artwork alone.  
In the first half  of  the 1920s, the distance of  the educationally 
privileged philosopher and critic Benjamin from the public opinion 
corresponded to a concept of  the ‘passive-consuming public’ that 
he retained for several years, even after his turn to communism in 
1924. In his literary-critical practice until 1926, the negative 
judgment of  the public [Publikum] implied a claim to leadership for 
the critic in the interpretation of  art and history vis-à-vis the 
‘public.’ It was not until 1927 that Benjamin began to see a real 
challenge in the task of  presenting a difficult book or author to the 
wider public, like in his review “Three Frenchmen” [“Drei 
Franzosen”] of  three books by Paul Souday on Marcel Proust, Paul 
Valéry and André Gide from October 1927 (WuN 13.1, p. 86; 
GS III, p. 80). Still, in One-Way Street [Einbahnstraße], published one 
year later, Benjamin stated in “The Critic’s Technique in Thirteen 
Theses” that his “higher authority” was “his colleagues,” “[n]ot the 
public. Still less, posterity” (SW 1, p. 460). The “strategist in the 
literary struggle” with the commandment “He who cannot take 
sides must keep silent” (ibid.) implied an ambivalent, if  not 
authoritarian, form of  relationship between the ‘public’ and critic. 
In the final thesis, Benjamin maintained the elitist demarcation of  
the critic from his readers, but strategically camouflaged as an 
apparent mandate of  the public by the critic: “The public must 
always be proved wrong, yet always feel represented by the critic” 
(ibid.). This corresponded to the formulation in thesis XI, which 




considered the critic to be ‘above’ the public, the eminent ‘spirit,’ 
who, as such, according to thesis XII, should “coin slogans,” 
“without betraying ideas” (ibid.).  
 
3. Study projects on elitist traditions since the second half  of  the 1920s by 
Gramsci and Benjamin 
Even though Gramsci was quite far away from such a concept of  
criticism, it is precisely for this reason that a common feature that 
characterizes his and Benjamin’s works in the second half  of  the 
1920s is astonishing: the confrontation with the literary and philo-
sophical traditions of  their countries in relation to the problem of  
the public sphere and the rise of  fascism. Gramsci first wrote about 
it in a four-part study plan in his letter of  19 March 1927 to Tatiana 
Schucht. It was not even half  a year after his arrest, the suspension 
of  freedom of  the press, and the ban on most parties. Gramsci 
planned “a  study of  the formation of  the public spirit in Italy 
during the last century; in other words, a study of  Italian intellect-
uals, their origins, their groupings in accordance with cultural 
currents, and their various modes of  thinking” [“una ricerca sulla 
formazione dello spirito pubblico in Italia nel secolo scorso; in altre 
parole, una ricerca sugli intellettuali italiani, le loro origini, i loro 
raggruppamenti secondo le correnti della cultura, i loro diversi 
modi di pensare”]. What is astonishing is that for Gramsci a study 
on intellectuals, “their origins, their groupings according to cultural 
currents,” is the flip side [“in altre parole”] of  an investigation of  
the “formation of  public spirit in Italy in the last century.”7 
Gramsci’s path to this approach can be better understood from 
his changing statements on Futurism. In the early article “The 
Futurists” [“I futuristi”], published in the Corriere Universitario in 
1913, Gramsci defended the Futurists, who as “newcomers have 
too much vitality to be forced to withdraw by the whispers and 
murmurs of  the gossipers” (Gramsci 2012, p. 49). Gramsci could 
overlook a cult of  masculinity and the fact that Futurists like 
Marinetti celebrated “militarism” and “war” as “the only hygiene of  
the world” (Marinetti 1909 / 2009, p. 51). He was, moreover, 
obviously attracted by Marinetti’s call to create an art on the basis 
of  a historical ‘tabula rasa’ and the rejection of  every bourgeois 
 
7 Gramsci to Tania Schucht, letter of  19 March 1927 (Gramsci 1996, p. 86; trans. taken from 
Gramsci 1994b; cf. also Gramsci 2012, p. 2). 




tradition: “We intend to destroy museums, libraries, academies of  
every sort, and to fight against moralism, feminism, and every 
utilitarian or opportunistic cowardice” (ibid.). In “Is Marinetti a 
Revolutionary?,” published in L’Ordine Nuovo on 5 January 1921, 
Gramsci continued to defend the Futurists under the assumption 
of  a “proletarian culture” that would be “totally different from the 
bourgeois one” (Gramsci 2000, p. 74), which is why the destruction 
of  bourgeois culture was the commandment that the Futurists 
followed. For Gramsci, this meant “destroy[ing] spiritual 
hierarchies, prejudices, idols and ossified traditions. It means not to 
be afraid of  innovations and audacities, not to be afraid of  
monsters, not to believe that the world will collapse if  a worker 
makes grammatical mistakes” (ibid.). Even in the field of  politics 
and economics, Gramsci stated, the socialists did not have as 
precise a conception as the thoroughly “revolutionary” and 
“Marxist” conception of  the Futurists had “in the field of  culture” 
(ibid.). Gramsci’s sympathy for the perspective of  creating a new 
culture of  workers ex nihilo went hand in hand with a firm 
statement for the Futurists. It was at the same time a conception of  
a purely proletarian revolution in which alliance issues were of  little 
consideration – a position that Gramsci would later criticize. 
In Gramsci’s letter to Trotsky on Futurism from 8 September 
1922, published in Trotsky’s collection of  essays Literature and 
Revolution (1924), which Benjamin also read – a month and a half  
before the fascist “March on Rome,” a changed position emerged. 
Gramsci now argued for a more social-historical approach and 
evaluated the Futurist statements on the First World War. In his 
eyes, they hardly offered any arguments for the Futurist movement. 
Within the dissolving Futurist movement, he now distinguished 
between different political currents: “The participants in the 
movement at the present moment include monarchists, 
communists, republicans and Fascists” (Gramsci 1994a, p. 244). 
This more austere assessment was influenced by the war and the 
statements of  the Futurists regarding it, because with the exception 
of  Giovanni Papini, according to Gramsci, “the most important 
exponents of  Futurism” became “the most resolute supporters of  
‘war to the bitter end’ and imperialisms” (ibid.). Gramsci thereby 
drew on an argument from the perspective of  the reception. The 
popularity of  the Futurists among workers had been high before 




the war. A full 80% of  the total circulation of  their magazine 
Lacerba (20,000 copies) had been read by workers (cf. 
Gramsci 1994a, p. 245). This had now changed: “The workers, who 
saw in Futurism the elements of  a struggle against the old Italian 
culture – academic, dried-up, alien from the people – are now in the 
midst of  an armed struggle for freedom and have little interest in 
the old debates. In the major industrial cities, the Proletkult 
programme, which aims to awaken workers’ literary and artistic 
creativity, absorbs the energy of  those who still have the time and 
the inclination to worry about this sort of  thing” (p. 246). 
Gramsci’s temporary interest in Proletkult positions cannot be 
found in Benjamin’s work.8 Gramsci’s position developed further 
after the fascists’ “March on Rome” at the end of  October 1922. 
Previously, together with Amadeo Bordiga, he had rejected the 
United Front policy of  the Comintern (cf. Adamson 1980 / 2002, 
pp. 359-60), which initially lasted until 1928. Now, he criticized 
Bordiga’s ‘sectarian politics,’ which Lenin had made the object of  
criticism in his Left-Wing Communism (cf. LCW 31, p. 113), and 
concluded that the conditions for a revolution in Western Europe 
were different from those in Russia. In Western Europe, cultural 
preparatory work was necessary; in Russia, on the other hand, a 
revolution had succeeded in a country in which bourgeois society 
had never been able to gain a solid foothold. In Gramsci’s anti-
fascist theory of  literature, literary and philosophical traditions now 
played a decisive role in the later elaboration of  the concept of  
hegemony. Therefore, after his return to Italy on 12 May 1924, 
Gramsci sought to strengthen the influence of  the Communist 
Party by building bridges to the southern Italian peasants 
(Adamson 1980 / 2002, p. 360). In this way, for Gramsci, the 
history of  “cultural currents” in relation to the “formation of  
public spirit” became a problem to be historically examined. 
A similar question can be found for Benjamin in his notes “Pro-
gram for Literary Criticism” [“Programm der literarischen Kritik”], 
which he wrote around 1930 (cf. SW 2, pp. 289-96). Benjamin 
intended to bring them into the form of  a programmatic essay, 
“The Task of  the Critic” [“Die Aufgabe des Kritikers”], which was 
conceived as an introductory part of  a book project approved by 
 
8 But see his acknowledgments of  it during his trip to Moscow in the Moscow Diary (GS 4, 
p. 387) and in “Piscator and Russland” (GS 4, p. 544). 




the Rowohlt publishing house at the beginning of  1930. The book 
was supposed to contain the larger essays “Der Sürrealismus” and 
“Karl Kraus” (Kaulen 1990, pp. 318-9). When the publishing house 
ran into difficulties in 1931 due to the economic crisis, the project 
failed. Nevertheless, central segments of  the text found their way 
into texts written at the same time, such as the review of  Siegfried 
Kracauer’s Die Angestellten, “Left-Wing Melancholy” or the essay 
“Karl Kraus”. The collection of  theses and reflections also 
contained work instructions and study projects. Thus, Benjamin 
formulated in the 5th thesis of  his ‘program,’ “the following critical 
work of  enlightenment should be deployed” (SW 2, p. 289). 
“Germany’s reading public [Leserkreis] has a highly peculiar 
structure. It can be divided into two roughly equal parts: ‘the public’ 
[das ‘Publikum’] and ‘the literary circles’ [die ‘Zirkel’]. There is scarcely 
any overlap between the two. The public regards literature as an 
instrument of  entertainment, animation, or the deepening of  
sociability – a pastime in a higher or lower sense. The literary circles 
regard books as books of  life, as sources of  wisdom, as the statutes 
of  their small groups – groups that alone bring bliss” (ibid.). The 
theses point to the virulent significance that Benjamin attributed to 
this comparison of  literary relations, presumably set against 
France.9 At the same time, they bear witness to efforts to attain a 
historical understanding, since the distance-marking quotation 
marks10 used for ‘public’ and ‘literary circle’ indicate two things. 
First, Benjamin abandoned the normative concept of  the passive-
consuming public, which was maintained up until his One-Way Street, 
as outlined earlier in this article. Second, however, he regarded the 
split into ‘circles’ and ‘the public’ not only as something historically 
generated but also as something specifically German, at the latest 
from this point on, since the assessment referred to ‘a highly 
peculiar structure’ of  “Germany’s reading public.” He described the 
 
9 Cf. Benjamin’s formulation in the context of  an interview with the French right-wing 
journalist and politician Georges Valois, who at the time tried to organize a fascist movement 
in France. The text appeared in Die Literarische Welt in the series “The Great Contradictions of  
our Time. A Series of  Articles and Interviews in Antithetical Order” [“Die großen Gegensätze 
unserer Zeit. Eine Reihe Artikel und Interviews in antithetischer Anordnung”]. In France, 
according to Benjamin, “the space for sects is narrow,” and the French public understands as 
hardly any other “on political wit” (GS IV, p. 489). 
10 Benjamin consistently used quotation marks for the terms ‘audience’ and ‘circle’ in the 5th 
thesis (GS VI, pp. 161-2). In the English translation, the quotation marks are understandably 
only used at the beginning. 




action of  tracing back the literature of  the ‘circles’ as a “by no 
means risk-free job of  enlightenment,” at the same time, “a 
preliminary study for the history of  sectarianism in Germany in the 
twentieth century” (SW 2, p. 290). It is remarkable how close 
Benjamin’s and Gramsci’s analyses of their respective countries of 
origin are, where fascism could come to power and which forced 
Benjamin into exile and Gramsci into prison. 
. In the 21st of  the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci wrote about the 
“very restricted meaning” of  the “‘national’” in Italy, which “does 
not in any case coincide with ‘popular’ because in Italy the 
intellectuals are distant from the people,” [“in Italia gli intellettuali 
sono lontani dal popolo”]; they are “tied instead to a caste tradition 
[“legati a una tradizione di casta”] that has never been broken by a 
strong popular or national political movement from below” 
(Gramsci 2012, p. 208; Gramsci 1975, Q21§5, p. 2116). The 
intellectuals, according to Gramsci, “do not know and sense their 
[the people’s] needs, aspirations and feelings”; they are “something 
detached, without foundation, a caste and not an articulation with 
organic functions of  the people themselves” (p. 209). For 
Benjamin, in turn, it was obviously not yet clear what this “highly 
potent and rapid development of  sectarianism” reached back to 
(SW 2, p. 290). But like Gramsci, he estimated its political 
significance to be quite high: “We can only predict that it will be the 
authentic form of  the barbarism to which Germany will succumb 
if  Communism fails to conquer.” (ibid.) Benjamin’s critique of  the 
‘circles’ was given the characteristic “of  the absence of  any 
relationship to collective activity” (ibid.). 
This strong judgment by Benjamin may be surprising. However, 
it was the time of  the political rise of  German fascism, which had 
become all too visible after the apparently sudden success of  the 
NSDAP in the September 1930 elections. In these elections, the 
Nazi party was able to increase its results from 2.6% in 1928 to 
18.3%, and was now the second-strongest faction in the Reichstag. 
During this period, the democratic forms in the Weimar Republic 
quickly disintegrated. At the end of  March 1930, the governing 
coalition of  the SPD, Zentrum, Deutsche Volkspartei (DVP) and 
Deutsche Demokratische Partei (DDP) broke down over the 
question of  how to deal with the unemployment insurance, which 
had only been introduced in July 1927, and the granting of  loans 




for the construction of  battle cruisers. After previous compromises, 
a majority within the SPD was not willing to make further 
concessions to their coalition partners. It was not until December 
1929, after the outbreak of  the crisis, that the SPD Reichstag 
faction decided to increase unemployment insurance contributions, 
and an opposition within the Social Democratic Party began to 
grow. This opposition referred to the SPD election program of  
May 1928 (“Apartments instead of  armored cruisers – vote  SPD!”) 
and founded the Socialist Workers’ Party in Autumn 1931 around 
the left-wing party organ Der Klassenkampf [The Class Struggle], 
against armament and further cuts to social services. Within the 
German KPD, the course of  the ultra-left wing that had already 
prevailed between April 1924 and the end of  1925 was resumed in 
1928, and in June 1929 it was programmatically established at the 
Wedding Party Congress. The ‘social fascism’ theory adopted at the 
6th World Congress of  the Comintern in July and August 1928 
meant the turning away of  the communist parties from the social 
democratic ones as allies, at the level of  Communist International. 
This strategy, which ultimately isolated the KPD, was based on the 
assessment that the working class would automatically join the 
communist parties in a crisis. Against the KPD leadership, an 
opposition within the KPD insisted on a United Front strategy 
(such as Heinrich Brandler, Jakob Walcher, August Thalheimer and 
Eduard Fuchs), members of  which were expelled from the KPD or 
resigned. They founded the Platform Communist Party Opposition 
(KPO) in December 1928, with the weekly magazine Gegen den 
Strom [Against the Current]. 
In 1932, Benjamin mentioned only in passing that a left united 
front was desirable.11 His interest in the policies of  individual 
parties cannot be compared to that of  Gramsci. But an interest 
became apparent in his studies of  the educational and cultural 
politics of  the SPD journal Die Neue Zeit (1883–1923) in Danish 
exile at Brecht’s in 1934.12 More strongly, on the other hand, he 
 
11 See Benjamin’s review “Der Irrtum des Aktivismus. Zu Kurt Hillers ‘Der Sprung ins Helle’” 
(WuN 13.1, p. 380 or GS III, p. 350). 
12 See Benjamin’s excerpts from the journal Die Neue Zeit (1883–1923), the theoretical organ of  
the Social Democratic Party (Walter Benjamin Archive, Berlin, Ms 1394-1707). In 1934, in 
Bertolt Brecht’s home in Svendborg, Benjamin excerpted over 220 essays and made 
bibliographical notes of  over 50 others from the journal in order to gain access to the 
educational and cultural policy orientation of  the SPD and its theoretical premises. He took 
the material with him to Paris in October 1934. Ernest Belfort Bax, Friedrich Engels, Henriette 




stressed the need for intellectuals to concern themselves with the 
labor movement. In “Left-Wing Melancholy” (1931), he criticized 
writers Erich Kästner, Walter Mehring and Kurt Tucholsky for their 
lack of  interest in the labor movement (SW 2, p. 424) and con-
tinued: “Left-radical publicists of  the stamp of  Kästner, Mehring, 
and Tucholsky are the decayed bourgeoisie’s mimicry of  the 
proletariat. Their function is to give rise, politically speaking, not to 
parties but to cliques; literarily speaking, not to schools but to 
fashions; economically speaking, not to producers but to agents” 
(ibid.). Even though Benjamin never became a member of  a 
political party, this passage published in the main theoretical organ 
of  the SPD, Die Gesellschaft, shows how much Benjamin’s political 
positioning had changed between 1928 and 1931. It is not too easily 
compatible with the public image of  Benjamin as a constantly 
‘nonconformist’ intellectual. This is all the more the case as for 
Benjamin the necessary correspondence to political practice in 1931 
became a literary-critical yardstick: “In short, this left-wing 
radicalism is precisely the attitude to which there is no longer, in 
general, any corresponding political action. It is not to the left of  
this or that tendency, but simply to the left of  what is in general 
possible” (SW 1, p. 425). 
To situate Benjamin’s positioning here within his own develop-
ment, a short sketch of  Benjamin’s intellectual self-understanding 
and his publication practice at the beginning of  the 1920s would 
help to make the changes Benjamin underwent up to 1931 clearer. 
Benjamin’s publication of  his essay on Dostoevsky’s The Idiot or the 
treatise “Fate and Character” [“Schicksal und Charakter”] in the 
literary monthly Die Argonauten (1914–1921), published by Richard 
Weißbach, was characteristic of  the publication strategy of  his non-
academic works of  the early 1920s. After Benjamin had refused 
Weißbach’s offer to take over the journal from the editor Ernst 
Blass, Weißbach suggested Benjamin found his own newspaper to 
replace Die Argonauten. This led to the conception of  the journal 
Angelus Novus, which Benjamin planned together with Scholem 
without being able to actualize it. With a small circulation of  300 
copies, it was to be published in four issues per year with 120 pages 
 
Roland-Holst, Paul Lafargue, Rosa Luxemburg, Oda Olberg, Anton Pannekoek, David 
Rjazanov, Leo Trotsky, Emil Vandervelde and Clara Zetkin were among those who wrote for 
the journal and whose articles Benjamin excerpted (Cf. Voigt 2015).  




each and could be subscribed to for a subscription fee of  150 
marks per annum. Benjamin also agreed in the contract that 
Weißbach would produce “a smaller number of  copies in luxury 
editions at increased prices.”13 According to Benjamin’s plan, in 
order to make it possible to publish free copies marked as sample 
copies to the “real, non-paying public,” the subscription should be 
understood as a “sponsored institution so that the journal does not 
have to cater to the public’s every whim” (Benjamin to Scholem, 
8.8.1921, GB 2, p. 183). The contributions for the first issue would 
be poems by Christoph Friedrich Heinle, dramatic poems by his 
brother Wolf, essays by Florens Christian Rang and Scholem, and 
Benjamin’s essay “The Task of  the Translator” [“Die Aufgabe des 
Übersetzers”].14 Benjamin’s publication practice at this time is char-
acterized by the calculation on wealthy patrons and the distancing 
attitude towards the public in favor of  selected friends and intellect-
uals, a “real, non-paying public.” This corresponded to the ‘unique-
ness’ of  the chosen historical “model,” as Benjamin wrote in the 
“Announcement of the Journal Angelus Novus” (cf. SW 1, pp. 292-3). 
With some differences, Benjamin had oriented his conceptual 
ideas towards Friedrich Schlegel’s journal Athenaeum, founded in 
1798. The journal went hand in hand with Schlegel’s elaboration of  
‘progressive universal poetry’ and marked a retreat to the small 
circle as the mode of  its realization. One year earlier, Schlegel had 
defended the Jacobin Georg Forster, who died in exile in Paris in 
1794, against attacks by Friedrich Schiller and Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe in their Xenien. In his “Fragment on a Characteristic of  the 
German Classic” [“Georg Forster. Fragment einer Charakteristik 
der deutschen Klassiker”] of  1797, Schlegel reviewed Forster as a 
‘societal writer’ in a relation to the public opinion.15 The exclusive 
association of  selected intellectuals in Benjamin’s conception of  the 
magazine tolerated the productive dissent between the contributors 
and, in this respect, differed from the school-forming community 
concept in the George Circle and the Blätter für die Kunst (1892–
 
13 See the contract with Richard Weißbach, which Benjamin attached to his letter to Scholem 
of  8 August 1921 (GB II, p. 184). 
14 For the journal project Angelus Novus, see Kaulen 1999, pp. 921-8 and Steiner 2006/2011, pp. 
301-8. 
15 Schlegel 1967, pp. 79-80. In his own dissertation, The Concept of  Criticism in German 
Romanticism, Benjamin in contrast to Pingoud (Pingoud 1914, p. 38-9) had not dealt with 
Schlegel’s Forster review. 




1919),16 which was bound by authority. But, with its “antithetics 
towards the bourgeois public, its elitist programmatic and its cult for 
individual persons,” the project, according to Heinrich Kaulen, had 
“numerous points of contact” with the “Blätter” (Kaulen 1999, p. 926). 
It was not until about 1926 that changes in Benjamin’s literary 
criticism became apparent, most clearly in the distancing described 
above, which Benjamin had carried out since that time, starting with 
the concept of  the consuming public. This development continued. 
Precisely because Benjamin, like Gramsci, saw the rise of  the 
political right in connection with the problem of  elitist, socially 
detached intellectuals, further developments occurred, which can be 
regarded as a confrontation with Nietzsche’s and Wyneken’s 
legacies. In 1929, Benjamin evaluated the French literary movement 
of  surrealism, among other things, with regard to two tasks of  the 
“revolutionary intelligentsia”: “to overthrow the intellectual 
predominance of  the bourgeoisie and to make contact with the 
proletarian masses” (SW 2, p. 217). From this, Benjamin developed 
the concept of  a writing strategy around 1930 that addressed the 
left bourgeois intelligentsia.17 At the same time, Benjamin began to 
deal with radical democratic traditions, like the young Karl Marx, in 
his essay on Karl Kraus (SW 2, pp. 454-5) and the Jacobin Georg 
Forster in his anthologyical works such as the series of  German 
Letters [Deutsche Briefe], published in 1931 in the Frankfurter Zeitung 
(SW 2, pp. 465-7) and German Men and Women [Deutsche Menschen] 
published in 1936 as a book by the Swiss publisher Vita-Nova 
(SW 3, pp. 173-4; for Benjamin’s reception of  Forster, see 
Peitsch 2001, pp. 115-22). The extent to which Benjamin’s 
intellectual self-understanding had changed from that of  One-Way 
Street can be seen in his confrontation with the concept of  a ‘free-
floating intelligence’ as advocated by Karl Mannheim in his book 
Ideology and Utopia in 1929 (Voigt 2018, pp. 226-38). Writers and 
critics, Benjamin claimed now in “Left-Wing Melancholy,” must 
separate themselves from neither the public nor the labor 
movement; they must not withdraw in leftist melancholy and 
“negativistic quiet” (SW 2, p. 425). Instead, they had to relate their 
own work to the “political” and “ideological” forces in society 
 
16 This difference has been ignored by Gert Mattenklott, possibly due to the unquestioned 
concept of  a rather homogeneous “Gemeinschaft” that Mattenklott adopted (Mattenklott 
2005, p. 284). 
17 Cf. Matthias Schmidt’s article in this volume. 




(SW 2, p. 424). In the discussions surrounding the preparation of  
the journal project Crisis and Criticism [Krisis und Kritik], Benjamin 
insisted in September 1930: “No intellectual today should go to a 
platform and make a claim, instead we work under the control of  
public opinion, we do not lead (Benjamin quotes from: Wizisla 
2009, p. 203). In relation to the concept of  intellectual leadership 
of  One-Way Street, this meant quite a change. 
This shift paved the way for an interest in reception theory 
(cf. Garber 1987, pp. 16-9, pp. 37-44; Kaulen 1987, pp. 91-197; 
Kaulen 1990, p. 333) and therefore in the literary historical works 
by Franz Mehring, an interest which, despite their differences, 
Benjamin18 shared with Leo Löwenthal and Georg Lukács. The 
interest stemmed from a double and combined perspective. On the 
one hand, the study of  historical changes and their possible causes 
in the reception of  literature allowed a more critical look at current 
literary historiographies and the literary canon. In this way, Mehring 
had attacked the nationalistic and conservative image of  Lessing 
held by the literary historians and professors of  German literature 
at the Friedrich-Wilhelm Universität in Berlin, Wilhelm Scherer and 
Erich Schmidt in The Lessing Legend (1893) [Die Lessing-Legende]. 
Scherer and Schmidt had turned Lessing into an admirer of  
Frederick II, and a liberal literary historian like Werner Mahrholz, 
whom Benjamin read, had acknowledged Mehring’s “pertinent” 
criticism in 1923 (Mahrholz 1923, p. 86). On the other hand, 
instead of  distancing art from the consuming public, reception 
theory gave access to socially shared traditions of  a certain time. 
This challenged Benjamin’s method of  interpreting history through 
the art work alone and, in this respect, corresponded to Gramsci’s 
interest in popular literature.  
 
 
18 See Benjamin’s essay “Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian” [“Eduard Fuchs, der Sammler 
und der Historiker”] (SW 3, pp. 262-3). Franz Mehring was one of  the frequently quoted 
authors in Benjamin’s excerpts from the journal Die Neue Zeit. Benjamin’s aesthetic philosophy 
of  history during the early 1920s programmatically refrained from studying the reception of  
works of  art, as Benjamin formulated it in his introductory essay “The Task of  the Translator”: 
“In the appreciation of  a work of  art or an art form, consideration of  the receiver never 
proves fruitful. Not only is any reference to a particular public or its representatives misleading, 
but even the concept of  an ‘ideal’ receiver is detrimental in the theoretical consideration of  art, 
since all it posits is the existence and nature of  man as such. Art, in the same way, posits man’s 
physical and spiritual existence, but in none of  its works is it concerned with his attentiveness. 
No poem is intended for the reader, no picture for the beholder, no symphony for the 
audience” (SW 1, p. 253). 




4. On Gramsci’s preoccupation with Benedetto Croce’s view on World War I 
In his “Notes on the Russian Revolution” of  29 April 1917, 
Gramsci had identified Jacobinism with the purely bourgeois of  the 
French Revolution (cf. Bianchi and Mussi 2017). His view changed 
during the 1920s. The lack of  a living Jacobin tradition in both Italy 
and Germany now played an important role for Benjamin and 
Gramsci in terms of  the possible emergence of  fascist movements 
and their attainment of  governmental power. Just as Gramsci was 
skeptical about the assumption of  pure spontaneity in the mass 
movement (cf. Sotiris 2019, p. 17), so Benjamin in the 1930s 
admitted that questions of  workers’ education played a decisive role 
in their social emancipation. Since about 1930, he had been guided 
by the assumption that the absence of  radical democratic traditions 
in Germany was of  great significance for the country’s reactionary 
developments. 
This idea forms part of  the background to Gramsci’s preoccupa-
tion with liberalism in Italy and one of  its main representatives, the 
Hegelian Benedetto Croce. Gramsci owed much to Croce. He, 
along with Antonio Labriola, was one of  his most important 
teachers. And, last but not least, the recognition of  the impact of  
philosophical and literary traditions throughout history was an 
element shared by Gramsci and Croce. At the same time, Gramsci 
criticized the specific nature of  the ‘ethico-political’ synthesis in 
Croce’s conception of  history, in which the influence of  political 
debates and struggles throughout history hardly mattered 
(Gramsci 2012, p. 105 and 1995, p. 344; Q10I§7, p. 1223).  
According to Gramsci, Croce could not become aware of  the 
tradition of  liberalism in which he operated because he had not 
dealt with the socio-historical context in which liberalism originated 
in Italy. In a comparison of  the Risorgimento with the French 
Jacobins, who Gramsci now assessed positively, he emphasized an 
essential condition of  Italian unity since 1861 in the Risorgimento: 
it had been a unity ‘from above,’ which even the democrats around 
Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872) had not succeeded in achieving 
with a liberation program for and together with the peasants 
(Bellamy 1992 / 2002, p. 140). Instead, the democrats had agreed to 
compromises with the owners of  large farmlands. The liberal 
democrats, Gramsci said, were afraid of  both the Jacobins in 
France and the peasants, because they feared uprisings. According 




to Gramsci, Croce had a share in this development through an 
elitist lack of  interest in a broad-based enlightenment that could 
have allowed large segments of  the population to participate in it. 
He had dismissed the weakness of  liberal traditions as something 
insignificant and abstracted it from the fact that the dominant cult-
ural currents in Italy separated themselves from the population, hung 
in the air, so to speak, and formed a caste (Bellamy 1992 / 2002, 
p. 138). Croce’s view of  history, therefore, formed an instance of  
what Gramsci noted in Notebook 21 under “Connections of  Prob-
lems”: “7) the unpopularity of  the Risorgimento or the indifference 
of  the masses towards the struggle for independence and national 
unity; 8) the political non-involvement of  the Italian people, ex-
pressed in the phrases ‘rebellionism’, ‘subversivism’ and a primitive 
and elementary ‘anti-statism’” (Gramsci 2012, pp. 200-1, Q21§1, pp. 
2108). Because Gramsci criticized Croce for drawing lines between 
disciplines and the Crocean synthesis of  an “ethico-political history” 
(Gramsci 2012, p. 104 and 1995, p. 343; Q10I §7, p. 1222) in his 
“Reference Points for an Essay on B. Croce” (“Punti di riferimento 
per un saggio su B. Croce”), Gramsci wanted to focus on Croce’s 
attitude during World War I as the “the guideline for understanding 
the reasons underlying his subsequent activity as a philosopher and 
leader of  European culture.”19 According to Gramsci, this “atti-
tude” pointed out “what intellectual and moral (and, thus, also also 
social) interests prevail even today in his literary and philosophical 
activity.”20 Croce never accepted that the war between Italy and 
Germany was one of  ‘civilization’ against ‘barbarism’ or ‘morality' 
vs. ‘immorality.’ In his opinion, however, intellectuals should not 
bring themselves down to the ‘level’ of  the masses but rather realize 
that the masses would never reach the level of  intellectuals (Finoc-
chiaro 1979/2002, p. 145). Gramsci, therefore, saw in Croce’s 
historical works a fear of  mass movements as a factor in political 
progress, which is also expressed by the fact that Croce was not at 
all interested in the activities of  parties in his historiography 
(Gramsci 2012, p. 105 and 1995, p. 344; Q10I§7, p. 1223).  
 
19 “L’atteggiamento del Croce durante la guerra mondiale come punto di orientamento per 
comprendere i motivi della sua attività posteriore di filosofo e di leader della cultura europea” 
(Gramsci 1975, Q10I <Summary>, p. 1207; Gramsci 1995, p. 328). 
20 “L’attegiamento del Croce durante la neutralità e la guerra indica quali interessi intellettuali e 
morali (e quindi sociali) predominano anche oggi nella sua attività letteraria e filosofica” 
(Gramsci 1995; p. 333; 1975, Q10I§1, pp. 1211-2). 




Gramsci’s remarks prove to be appropriate. In his History of  
Europe in the Nineteenth Century [Storia d’Europa nel secolo decimonono], 
published in Italian in 1932 and translated into English in 1933, 
Croce attributed the outbreak of  World War I to an ‘activist’ state 
of  mind. For Croce, it was less an “imperialism” or even a 
“nationalism” that had led to the war but rather an “activism” 
which arose when the Hegelian principle of  “liberty is deprived of  
its moral soul” (Croce 1933, p. 342). This activism, said Croce, 
“leads to the domination of  the individual over individuals, to the 
enslavement of  others and therefore of  itself, to the depression of  
personality” (p. 343). The outline of  this history of  ideas in Croce’s 
account was not only abstracted from the efforts of  left-wing 
groups in the European social democratic parties to prevent a 
world war. Rather, he blamed them for ‘activism’ (cf. pp. 340-1). 
 
5. Conclusion 
As different as Benjamin’s and Gramsci’s theoretical and political 
developments may be, they overlap in similar analyses and interests 
in relation to the problem of  elitist traditions. Some results may 
seem less relevant today, such as the question of  ‘national unity’ in 
Gramsci. However, even though the two are connected, it is 
important to distinguish between the results and questions of  the 
time on the one hand and the methods of  their treatment on the 
other. The virulence with which Gramsci and Benjamin returned to 
developments far back in time when fascism was currently 
emerging shows that emphasis was placed on the inheritance of  
traditions, their context of  origin and their relation to the present. 
Gramsci’s positions could also be understood as an objection to the 
assumption made by Gustave Le Bon and José Ortega y Gasset, 
which continues to be encountered today,21 namely that the 
intellectual is ‘intelligent’ while the masses are ‘emotional,’ easily 
influenced or ‘average.’ Gramsci and especially early Benjamin also 
have tendencies in this direction. However, these tendencies are 
counteracted by the fact that, as Gramsci had written, people judge 
their social relations with the terms and words available to them. In 
his 1918 essay “The Russian Utopia,” [“Utopia”] Gramsci wrote: 
“It is not the economic structure that directly determines political 
action, but rather the interpretation given to it and to the so-called 
 
21 See Fontana for such a reading of  Gramsci (2015, p. 58 and 68). 




laws that govern its development” (SW 1, p. 46). In their 
discussions of  (the rise of) fascism in Italy and Germany, Gramsci 
and Benjamin arrive at positions that emphasize the connection 
between social and cultural history, which is not always evident in 
cultural studies today. They shared the view that elitist traditions 
were at least helpless against a political development to the right, or 
even played a part in it. In April 1942, Ernst Bloch published an 
article entitled “The Nazi Stews in his Own Juice” [“Der Nazi 
kocht im eigenen Saft”] in the Mexican exile journal Freies 
Deutschland, in which he argued that Nazis did not need any 
philosophy or literature from the past but created “bloodhounds of  
capital” from “millions of  dull anti-capitalists” without any 
philosophical or literary tradition (Bloch 1942, p. 17). In this way, 
Bloch separated the rise of  fascism in Germany from any cultural 
tradition whatsoever. His friend Walter Benjamin had argued 
against such an assumption in the essay “Eduard Fuchs, Collector 
and the Historian” five years earlier, believing that the isolation of  a 
concept of  culture from social history was a ‘problematic unity’ 
(SW 3, p. 267). It cannot only be accompanied by the illusion of  a 
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